Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions.

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the legal reform concerning employees? inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new law concerning university employees and the pending reform proposal concerning other employees also fail to implement first-best incentives. With suboptimal incentives to spend effort on inventions, the government?s goal, an increase in the number of patents, is likely to be missed. (88 words)

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 2003-03

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Contract Law ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Moral hazard ; hold-up ; efficient fixed wage ; Vorschlagswesen ; Patentrecht ; Vergütungssystem ; Agency Theory ; Theorie ; Deutschland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kirstein, Roland ; Will, Birgit E.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
• (where): Saarbrücken
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23132
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET