CEO compensation

Arbeitspapier

This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a competitive market for managerial talent. We describe and discuss the empirical evidence on the evolution of CEO pay and on the relationship between pay and firm performance since the 1930s. Our review suggests that both managerial power and competitive market forces are important determinants of CEO pay, but that neither approach is fully consistent with the available evidence. We briefly discuss promising directions for future research.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3277

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Production and Organizations: General ; Corporate Finance and Governance: General ; Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Labor Contracts ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Thema: executive compensation ; managerial incentives ; incentive compensation ; equity compensation ; option compensation ; corporate governance ; Führungskräfte ; Vergütungssystem ; Anreizvertrag ; Macht ; Wettbewerb ; Unternehmensentwicklung

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Frydman, Carola ; Jenter, Dirk
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46273
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ