Arbeitspapier

All symmetric equilibria in differential games with public goods

We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is constructed. The equilibrium in continuous strategies, unique in our context, is Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium. If a Pareto- undominated steady state exists, it is sustained by trigger-like strategies, with deviations above and below the steady state leading to different re- sponses. We extend the theory of differential games to deal with payoffs under discontinuous strategies. Our methods work under general functional forms.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-020/II

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Subject
Spieltheorie
Analysis
Öffentliche Güter
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Klimawandel
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Jaakkola, Niko
Wagener, Florian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2020

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Jaakkola, Niko
  • Wagener, Florian
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2020

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