Arbeitspapier
All symmetric equilibria in differential games with public goods
We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is constructed. The equilibrium in continuous strategies, unique in our context, is Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium. If a Pareto- undominated steady state exists, it is sustained by trigger-like strategies, with deviations above and below the steady state leading to different re- sponses. We extend the theory of differential games to deal with payoffs under discontinuous strategies. Our methods work under general functional forms.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-020/II
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Subject
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Spieltheorie
Analysis
Öffentliche Güter
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Klimawandel
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Jaakkola, Niko
Wagener, Florian
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2020
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Jaakkola, Niko
- Wagener, Florian
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2020