Teams Punish Less

Arbeitspapier

Many decisions in politics and business are made by teams rather than by single individuals. In contrast, economic models typically assume an individual rational decision maker. A rapidly growing body of (experimental) literature investigates team decisions in different settings. We study team decisions in a public goods contribution game with a costly punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team decision-making rules (unanimity, majority). We find that teams contribute significantly more and punish less than individuals, regardless of the team decision rule. Overall, teams yield higher payoffs than individuals.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4406

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy
• Subject: group decision making ; public good ; experiment ; punishment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Auerswald, Heike ; Schmidt, Carsten ; Thum, Marcel ; Torsvik, Gaute
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84173