Arbeitspapier
Teams Punish Less
Many decisions in politics and business are made by teams rather than by single individuals. In contrast, economic models typically assume an individual rational decision maker. A rapidly growing body of (experimental) literature investigates team decisions in different settings. We study team decisions in a public goods contribution game with a costly punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team decision-making rules (unanimity, majority). We find that teams contribute significantly more and punish less than individuals, regardless of the team decision rule. Overall, teams yield higher payoffs than individuals.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4406
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Thema
-
group decision making
public good
experiment
punishment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Auerswald, Heike
Schmidt, Carsten
Thum, Marcel
Torsvik, Gaute
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Auerswald, Heike
- Schmidt, Carsten
- Thum, Marcel
- Torsvik, Gaute
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2013
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