Incentives for international environmental cooperation: Theoretic models and economic instruments

Arbeitspapier

This paper surveys the rapidly growing theoretical literature on international environmental agreements. The surveyed contributions are classified according to the conceivable strategies to create incentives for the participation in and compliance with environmental conventions. The proposed taxonomy of instruments consists of (i) the choice and particular form of the internalisation instrument; (ii) carrot-stick strategies that make co-operative pollution reductions dependent on the past behaviour of other countries (internal stabilization); (iii) transfers and sanctions of various forms (external stabilization); (iv) unilateral and accompanying measures by single countries or subcoalitions; and (v) long-term provisions to increase the flexibility of agreements and to improve the framework conditions for international negotiations.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 56.1998

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; International Economic Order and Integration ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
• Subject: International environmental agreements ; Co-operation ; Transboundary environmental externalities ; Incentive compatibility ; Enforcement ; Umweltabkommen ; Internationale Zusammenarbeit ; Externer Effekt ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schmidt, Carsten
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 1998

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154914
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET