Enforcement and cost-effectiveness of international environmental agreements: The role of side-payments

Arbeitspapier

The paper explores the prospects for international environmental cooperation in a context of limited enforcement, if we allow for side-payments between countries and sequential moves in the implementation of the agreement. The framework of the analysis is a static model of heterogenous countries formulated in terms of costs and benefits of emission abatements. Taking the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as starting-point for negotiations, a mechanism is analysed that uses self-financed transfers as an instrument to create and enforce an international environmental agreement. Two kinds of side-payments are considered: transfers that are self-financed but otherwise unrestricted, and transfers that are restricted to compensations for cost-effectiveness of abatements. Numerical simulations for the different scenarios considered illustrate the gains from cooperation that can be achieved with this mechanism.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 350

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Externalities ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: General ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
• Thema: Internationale Umweltpolitik ; Internationale Finanzhilfe ; Spieltheorie ; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schmidt, Carsten
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
• (wo): Konstanz
• (wann): 1997

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101644
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ