Leakage, welfare, and cost-effectiveness of carbon policy

Arbeitspapier

We extend the model of Fullerton, Karney, and Baylis (2012 working paper) to explore cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy in the presence of leakage. We ignore the welfare gain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions and focus on the welfare cost of the emissions tax or permit scheme. Whereas that prior paper solves for changes in emissions quantities and finds that leakage maybe negative, we show here that all cases with negative leakage in that model are cases where a unilateral carbon tax results in a welfare loss. With positive leakage, however, a unilateral policy can improve welfare.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4101

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy ; Energy: Government Policy ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy
• Thema: trade and environment ; pollution havens ; unilateral climate policy ; Klimaschutz ; Soziale Kosten ; Außenwirtschaft ; Ökosteuer ; Substitutionseffekt ; Auslandsverlagerung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Baylis, Kathy ; Fullerton, Don ; Karney, Dan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69598
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ