Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric information renders minimum wages less harmful

We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2623

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
minimum wages
unemployment
asymmetric information
labour market regulation
Mindestlohn
Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse
Beschäftigungseffekt
Asymmetrische Information
Arbeitsproduktivität
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schöb, Ronnie
Thum, Marcel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schöb, Ronnie
  • Thum, Marcel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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