Arbeitspapier
Asymmetric information renders minimum wages less harmful
We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2623
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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minimum wages
unemployment
asymmetric information
labour market regulation
Mindestlohn
Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse
Beschäftigungseffekt
Asymmetrische Information
Arbeitsproduktivität
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schöb, Ronnie
Thum, Marcel
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schöb, Ronnie
- Thum, Marcel
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2009