Centralized Admission Systems and School Segregation: Evidence from a National Reform

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates whether centralized admissions systems can alter school segregation. We take advantage of the largest school-admission reform implemented to date: Chile's SAS, which in 2016 replaced the country's decentralized system with a Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We exploit its incremental implementation and employ a Difference-in-Difference design. Using rich administrative student-level records, we find the effect of SAS critically depends on pre-existing levels of residential segregation and local school supply. For instance, districts with prominent provision of private education experience an uptick in school segregation due to SAS. Migration of high-SES students to private schools emerges as a key driver.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13305

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Education and Research Institutions: General ; Education and Inequality ; Education: Government Policy
• Subject: education ; inequality ; segregation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kutscher, Macarena ; Nath, Shanjukta ; Urzua, Sergio
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2020

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/223747
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET