Arbeitspapier
Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes
The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working paper ; No. 10-2005
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Organization of Production
- Thema
-
Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions
taxes
MNEs
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nielsen, Søren Bo
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
Schjelderup, Guttorm
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Frederiksberg
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nielsen, Søren Bo
- Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
- Schjelderup, Guttorm
- Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2005