Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes

Arbeitspapier

The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1586

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Organization of Production
• Thema: centralized vs. de-centralized decisions ; taxes ; MNEs ; Multinationales Unternehmen ; Steuer ; Organisationsstruktur ; Transferpreis ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Nielsen, Søren Bo ; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis ; Schjelderup, Guttorm
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19050
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ