Arbeitspapier

Centralized Admission Systems and School Segregation: Evidence from a National Reform

This paper investigates whether centralized admissions systems can alter school segregation. We take advantage of the largest school-admission reform implemented to date: Chile's SAS, which in 2016 replaced the country's decentralized system with a Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We exploit its incremental implementation and employ a Difference-in-Difference design. Using rich administrative student-level records, we find the effect of SAS critically depends on pre-existing levels of residential segregation and local school supply. For instance, districts with prominent provision of private education experience an uptick in school segregation due to SAS. Migration of high-SES students to private schools emerges as a key driver.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13305

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Education and Research Institutions: General
Education and Inequality
Education: Government Policy
Thema
education
inequality
segregation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kutscher, Macarena
Nath, Shanjukta
Urzua, Sergio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kutscher, Macarena
  • Nath, Shanjukta
  • Urzua, Sergio
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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