Arbeitspapier

Venture Cycles: Theory and Evidence

We demonstrate how endogenous information acquisition in venture capital markets creates investment cycles when competing financiers undertake their screening decisions in an uncoordinated way, thereby highlighting the role of intertemporal screening externalities induced by competition among venture capitalists as a structural source of instability. We show that uncoordinated screening behavior of competing financiers is an independent source of fluctuations inducing venture investment cycles. We also empirically document the existence of cyclical features in a number of industries such as biotechnology, electronics, financial services, healthcare, medical services and consumer products.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 882

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
screening
venture capital
investment cycles

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gehrig, Thomas
Stenbacka, Rune
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gehrig, Thomas
  • Stenbacka, Rune
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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