Arbeitspapier

Venture Cycles: Theory and Evidence

We demonstrate how endogenous information acquisition in venture capital markets creates investment cycles when competing financiers undertake their screening decisions in an uncoordinated way, thereby highlighting the role of intertemporal screening externalities induced by competition among venture capitalists as a structural source of instability. We show that uncoordinated screening behavior of competing financiers is an independent source of fluctuations inducing venture investment cycles. We also empirically document the existence of cyclical features in a number of industries such as biotechnology, electronics, financial services, healthcare, medical services and consumer products.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 882

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
screening
venture capital
investment cycles

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gehrig, Thomas
Stenbacka, Rune
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gehrig, Thomas
  • Stenbacka, Rune
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2003

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