Arbeitspapier
Electoral Cycles in Perceived Corruption: International Empirical Evidence
I examine whether elections influence perceived corruption in the public sector. Perceived corruption in the public sector is measured by the reversed Transparency International’s Perception of Corruption Index (CPI). The dataset includes around 100 democracies over the period 2012-2016, a sample for which the CPI is comparable across countries and over time. The results show that the reversed CPI was about 0.4 points higher in election years than in other years, indicating that perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections. The effect is especially pronounced before early elections (1.0 points) compared to regular elections (0.4 points). Future research needs to investigate why perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7393
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
- Thema
-
perceived corruption
elections
political manipulation
panel data
democracies
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Potrafke, Niklas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Potrafke, Niklas
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018
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