Arbeitspapier
Evidence on the political principal-agent problem fromvoting on public finance for concert halls
Principal-agent problems can arise when preferences of voters are not aligned with preferences of political representatives. Often the consequence of the political principalagentproblem is political catering to special interests. In this paper I provide examples of principal-agent problems regarding public spending. The examples concern construction or extension of concert halls in two German cities. Resistance to public funding for the concert halls was particularly strong in electoral districts with large constituencieson the left. The evidence indicates that political representatives were more bourgeois than their constituencies. In the cases studied asymmetric information did not prevailand voters were able to discipline their representatives through referenda that countered the results of voting by political representatives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 164
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
- Thema
-
Principal-agent problem
referendum
direct democracy
political representation
political ideology
cultural policy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Potrafke, Niklas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Potrafke, Niklas
- ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
Entstanden
- 2013
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