Arbeitspapier

Buy coal for preservation and act strategically on the fuel market

In Harstad´s (2012) model, climate damage only hits one group of countries, called the coalition, and the coalition´s climate policy consists of capping own fuel demand and supply combined with the purchase of fossil fuel deposits for preservation. Harstad´s Theorem 1 states that if the deposit market clears the coalition´s strategic fuel-cap policy implements the first-best. The present paper reconstructs that efficiency result and argues that the deposit market equilibrium as defined in Harstad (2012) fails to be attained, unless the non-coalition countries act cooperatively on the deposit market. Without such cooperation, the coalition´s strategic action on the fuel market distorts the allocation to its own favor.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 178-15

Classification
Wirtschaft
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply; Prices
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
Subject
climate coalition
fossil fuel
deposits
extraction
fuel caps

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eichner, Thomas
Pethig, Rüdiger
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
(where)
Siegen
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eichner, Thomas
  • Pethig, Rüdiger
  • Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht

Time of origin

  • 2015

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