Arbeitspapier
Buy coal for preservation and act strategically on the fuel market
In Harstad´s (2012) model, climate damage only hits one group of countries, called the coalition, and the coalition´s climate policy consists of capping own fuel demand and supply combined with the purchase of fossil fuel deposits for preservation. Harstad´s Theorem 1 states that if the deposit market clears the coalition´s strategic fuel-cap policy implements the first-best. The present paper reconstructs that efficiency result and argues that the deposit market equilibrium as defined in Harstad (2012) fails to be attained, unless the non-coalition countries act cooperatively on the deposit market. Without such cooperation, the coalition´s strategic action on the fuel market distorts the allocation to its own favor.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 178-15
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply; Prices
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Subject
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climate coalition
fossil fuel
deposits
extraction
fuel caps
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Eichner, Thomas
Pethig, Rüdiger
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
- (where)
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Siegen
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Eichner, Thomas
- Pethig, Rüdiger
- Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
Time of origin
- 2015