Buy coal for preservation and act strategically on the fuel market

Konferenzbeitrag

In Harstad's (2012) model, climate damage only hits one group of countries, called the coalition, and the coalition's climate policy consists of capping own fuel de- mand and supply combined with the purchase of fossil fuel deposits for preserva- tion. Harstad's Theorem 1 states that if the deposit market clears the coalition's strategic fuel-cap policy implements the first-best. The present paper reconstructs that efficiency result and argues that the deposit market equilibrium as defined in Harstad (2012) fails to be attained, unless the non-coalition countries act cooper- atively on the deposit market. Without such cooperation, the coalition's strategic action on the fuel market distorts the allocation to its own favor.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Environmental Economics: Policy ; No. B15-V1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply; Prices ; Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Pethig, Rüdiger ; Eichner, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel und Hamburg
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145658
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET