Arbeitspapier
Buy coal to mitigate climate damage and benefit from strategic deposit action
In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel and deposits, some coalition of countries fights climate change by purchasing and preserving fossil fuel deposits, which would be exploited otherwise. If the coalition's policy parameters are the demand and supply of deposits (deposit policy), the outcome is inefficient, but the coalition is better off with than without exerting market power by influencing prices in its own favor. In the special case, in which noncoalition countries do not suffer from climate damage, the outcome is efficient if the coalition is a price taker on both markets, but inefficient otherwise. The latter result demonstrates that Harstad's (2012, Theorem 1) efficiency result is not robust with respect to variations in the concepts of deposit market and strategic behavior. We also analyze a policy where the coalition's first policy parameter is its deposit demand, as before, and the second policy parameter is fuel supply rather than deposit supply. That policy turns out to be equivalent to the deposit policy (as defined above) under some conditions but non-equivalent under others.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 177-15
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply; Prices
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Subject
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climate coalition
fossil fuel
deposits
extraction
deposit policy
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Eichner, Thomas
Pethig, Rüdiger
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
- (where)
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Siegen
- (when)
-
2015
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Eichner, Thomas
- Pethig, Rüdiger
- Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
Time of origin
- 2015
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Das Gebuehrenkonzept der DSD auf dem oekonomischen Pruefstand
Unilateral mitigation of climate damage via purchase of fossil fuel deposits
Forging a global environmental agreement through trade sanctions on free riders?
Buy coal for preservation and act strategically on the fuel market
Buy coal for preservation and act strategically on the fuel market
The carbon-budget approach to climate stabilization: Costeffective subglobal versus global action
Efficient management of insecure fossil fuel imports through taxing (!) domestic green energy?
Incidence of unilateral consumption taxes on world carbon emissions
Corrective Taxation for Curbing Pollution and Promoting Green Product Design and Recycling
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Petchey's (2015) Extension of Oates & Schwab's (1988) Efficiency Result Revisited
Self-enforcing capital tax coordination
Das Gebuehrenkonzept der DSD auf dem oekonomischen Pruefstand
Unilateral mitigation of climate damage via purchase of fossil fuel deposits
Forging a global environmental agreement through trade sanctions on free riders?
Buy coal for preservation and act strategically on the fuel market
Buy coal for preservation and act strategically on the fuel market
The carbon-budget approach to climate stabilization: Costeffective subglobal versus global action
Efficient management of insecure fossil fuel imports through taxing (!) domestic green energy?
Incidence of unilateral consumption taxes on world carbon emissions
Corrective Taxation for Curbing Pollution and Promoting Green Product Design and Recycling
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Petchey's (2015) Extension of Oates & Schwab's (1988) Efficiency Result Revisited
Self-enforcing capital tax coordination