Konferenzbeitrag
Forging a global environmental agreement through trade sanctions on free riders?
This paper studies the formation of self-enforcing global environmental agreements in a world economy with international trade and two groups of countries that differ with respect to fuel demand and environmental damage. It investigates whether the signatories threat to embargo (potential) free riders secures all countries participation in the agreement. Resorting to numerical analysis, we find that an embargo may be unnecessary, ineffective or even counterproductive - depending on the degree of asymmetry and other parameters. On some subset of parameters, the embargo stabilizes the otherwise unstable global agreement, but the threat of embargo is not credible. However, in some of these cases credibility can be restored by suitable intra-coalition transfers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: International Trade II ; No. B08-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Trade and Environment
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Issues in International Trade
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eichner, Thomas
Pethig, Rüdiger
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Eichner, Thomas
- Pethig, Rüdiger
Entstanden
- 2015
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