Arbeitspapier
Self-Confidence and Strategic Deterrence
We examine factors that may contribute to 'overconfidence' in relative ability on an intelligence test. We test experimentally for evidence of self-esteem concerns and instrumental strategic concerns. Errors in Bayesian updating are rare when the information does not involve own relative ability, but far more common when it does, suggesting self-esteem issues. There is also strong evidence that males state higher levels of confidence in relative ability when this precedes a tournament; as entry is predicted by relative confidence, this can be an effective deterrent. Inflating confidence can be part of an equilibrium strategy, providing a rationale for strategic overconfidence.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-151/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Self-confidence
overconfidence
strategic deterrence
unconscious behavior
selfdeception
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Charness, Gary
Rustichini, Aldo
van de Ven, Jeroen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Charness, Gary
- Rustichini, Aldo
- van de Ven, Jeroen
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2011
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