Arbeitspapier
Strategic Targeted Advertising
We present a strategic game of pricing and targeted-advertising. Firms cansimultaneously target priceadvertisements to different groups of customers, or to the entiremarket. Pure strategy equilibria do not exist and thus marketsegmentation cannot occur surely. Equilibria exhibit random advertising--to induce an unequal distribution of information in the market-- andrandom pricing --to obtain profits from badly informed buyers--. Wecharacterize a positive profits equilibrium where firms advertise lowprices to a segment of consumers, high prices to a distinct segment ofconsumers, and intermediate prices to the entire market. As a resultthe market is segmented only from time to time and presentssubstantial price dispersion across segments.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-035/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Targeted advertising
oligopoly
price dispersion
segmented markets.
Preisdifferenzierung
Marktsegmentierung
Oligopol
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Galeotti, Andrea
Moraga, Jose Luis
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Galeotti, Andrea
- Moraga, Jose Luis
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2003
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Targeted Advertising and Social Status
A Model of Strategic Targeted Advertising
Reputation Shocks and Strategic Responses in Electoral Campaigns
On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations
Advertising for Attention in a Consumer Search Model
Advertising and Consumer Search in a Duopoly Model
Information and Strategic Voting
Should Pollution Taxes Be Targeted At Income Redistribution?
Strategic versus Financial Investors: The Role of Strategic Objectives in Financial Contracting
Customer Directed Advertising and Product Quality
Tax Rates as Strategic Substitutes
Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparancy
Targeted Advertising and Social Status
A Model of Strategic Targeted Advertising
Reputation Shocks and Strategic Responses in Electoral Campaigns
On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations
Advertising for Attention in a Consumer Search Model
Advertising and Consumer Search in a Duopoly Model
Information and Strategic Voting
Should Pollution Taxes Be Targeted At Income Redistribution?
Strategic versus Financial Investors: The Role of Strategic Objectives in Financial Contracting
Customer Directed Advertising and Product Quality
Tax Rates as Strategic Substitutes
Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparancy
Targeted Advertising and Social Status
A Model of Strategic Targeted Advertising
Reputation Shocks and Strategic Responses in Electoral Campaigns
On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations
Advertising for Attention in a Consumer Search Model
Advertising and Consumer Search in a Duopoly Model
Information and Strategic Voting
Should Pollution Taxes Be Targeted At Income Redistribution?
Strategic versus Financial Investors: The Role of Strategic Objectives in Financial Contracting
Customer Directed Advertising and Product Quality
Tax Rates as Strategic Substitutes