Arbeitspapier
Financial Intermediation and Entry Deterrence
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between an incumbent firm's financial contract with abank and its product market decisions in the face of the threat of entry, in a dynamic model.The main results of the paper are: there exists a separating equilibrium with no limit pricing; thelow-cost incumbent repays more to the bank in the first period, due to the threat of entry; andthere are parameter values for which the bank makes more profits with the threat of entry thanwithout.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 01-037/2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Entry
Intermediation
Limit Pricing
Banking
information
Finanzintermediation
Markteintritt
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Jain, Neelam
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Mirman, Leonard J.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Jain, Neelam
- Jeitschko, Thomas D.
- Mirman, Leonard J.
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2001
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