A class of evolutionary models for participation games

Arbeitspapier

We introduce a framework to analyze the interaction of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents repeatedly playing a participation game with negative feedback. We assume that agents use different behavioral rules prescribing how to play the game conditionally on the outcome of previous rounds. We update the fraction of the population using each rule by means of a general class of evolutionary dynamics based on imitation, which contains both replicator and logit dynamics. Our model is analyzed by a combination of formal analysis and numerical simulations and is able to replicate results from the experimental and computational literature on these types of games. In particular, irrespective of the specific evolutionary dynamics and of the exact behavioral rules used, the dynamics of the aggregate participation rate is consistent with the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, whereas individual behavior clearly departs from it. Moreover, as the number of players or speed of adjustment increase the evolutionary dynamics typically becomes unstable and leads to endogenous fluctuations around the steady state. These fluctuations are robust with respect to behavioral rules that try to exploit them.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: LEM Working Paper Series ; No. 2010/14

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: Participation games ; Heterogeneous behavioral rules ; Revision protocol ; Replicator Dynamics ; Logit Dynamics ; Nonlinear dynamics ; Spieltheorie ; Evolutionsökonomik ; Verhalten ; Logit-Modell ; Nichtlineare dynamische Systeme ; Simulation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dindo, Pietro ; Tuinstra, Jan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM)
• (where): Pisa
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89307
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET