Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence

Arbeitspapier

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting. In one parameterization we find that overall provision is lower under sequential than simultaneous contributions, as predicted, but the distribution of contributions is not as extreme as predicted and first movers do not attain their predicted firstmover advantage. In another parameterization we again find that the distribution of contributions is not as predicted when the first mover is predicted to free ride, but we find strong support for equilibrium predictions when the second mover is predicted to free ride. These results can be explained by second movers' willingness to punish first movers who free ride, and unwillingness to reward first movers who contribute.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2009-17

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Public Goods
• Subject: public goods ; voluntary contributions ; sequential moves ; experiment ; Öffentliches Gut ; Spende ; Spieltheorie ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gächter, Simon ; Nosenzo, Daniele ; Renner, Elke ; Sefton, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
• (where): Nottingham
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49684
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET