Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules

Arbeitspapier

In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the "true majority". If voting is sequential as in the roll call votes of the US Senate then, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the "true majority" prevails (Groseclose and Milyo, 2010, 2013). In this paper, it is shown that the result for sequential voting holds also with different weights of voters (shareholders) or with multiple necessary majorities (EU decision making). Simultaneous voting in the general model can be plagued by non-existent or non-unique pure strategy equilibria under most preference constellations.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 394

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Public Goods ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Thema: voting ; free riding ; binary decisions ; unique equilibria

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bolle, Friedel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics
• (wo): Frankfurt (Oder)
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156683
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ