Arbeitspapier
Voting on contributions to a threshold public goods game: An experimental investigation
We introduce a binding unanimous voting rule to a public goods game with an uncertain threshold for the total group contribution. In a laboratory experiment we find that voting generates significantly higher total contributions than making individual voluntary contributions to the public good. Heterogeneity with regard to marginal costs of contribution makes coordination on the threshold value somewhat more di cult when voting, but apparently facilitates coordination when not voting. Homogeneous non-voting groups instead exhibit a breakdown of contributions commonly observed in linear public goods games, but unusual for a threshold setting. We also notice a preference for payoff symmetry over maximization of expected welfare in heterogeneous voting groups, which to a lesser extent also appears in nonvoting groups. Using a top-down rule, i.e., splitting the voting process into two separate votes on 1) total contribution and 2) individual contributions does not affect these results.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: KIT Working Paper Series in Economics ; No. 60
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Public Goods
- Thema
-
public good
threshold uncertainty
experimental economics
unanimous voting
committee
heterogeneity
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Feige, Christian
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin
Krämer, Jan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
- (wo)
-
Karlsruhe
- (wann)
-
2014
- DOI
-
doi:10.5445/IR/1000042776
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:swb:90-427760
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Feige, Christian
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin
- Krämer, Jan
- Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Entstanden
- 2014
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Voting and Equilibrium Selection in Threshold Public Goods Games
Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game
Simple games versus weighted voting games: Bounding the critical threshold value
On a class of threshold public goods games: With applications to voting and the Kyoto Protocol
Guilt in voting and public good games
Experimental investigations of binary threshold public good games
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
Meet Me at the Threshold - Asymmetric Preferences in a Threshold Public Goods Game
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Voting and Equilibrium Selection in Threshold Public Goods Games
Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game
Simple games versus weighted voting games: Bounding the critical threshold value
On a class of threshold public goods games: With applications to voting and the Kyoto Protocol
Guilt in voting and public good games
Experimental investigations of binary threshold public good games
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
Meet Me at the Threshold - Asymmetric Preferences in a Threshold Public Goods Game
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Voting and Equilibrium Selection in Threshold Public Goods Games
Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game
Simple games versus weighted voting games: Bounding the critical threshold value
On a class of threshold public goods games: With applications to voting and the Kyoto Protocol
Guilt in voting and public good games
Experimental investigations of binary threshold public good games
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
Meet Me at the Threshold - Asymmetric Preferences in a Threshold Public Goods Game
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game