Arbeitspapier
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 11-065
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Thema
-
Public good
threshold uncertainty
ambiguity
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dannenberg, Astrid
Löschel, Andreas
Paolacci, Gabriele
Reif, Christiane
Tavoni, Alessandro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dannenberg, Astrid
- Löschel, Andreas
- Paolacci, Gabriele
- Reif, Christiane
- Tavoni, Alessandro
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2011