Arbeitspapier
Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: School of Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 1506
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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public good
threshold
impulse balance theory
quantal response
forced contribution
ordinal potential
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cartwright, Edward
Stepanova, Anna
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Kent, School of Economics
- (where)
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Canterbury
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cartwright, Edward
- Stepanova, Anna
- University of Kent, School of Economics
Time of origin
- 2015