Arbeitspapier

Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game

We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: School of Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 1506

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
public good
threshold
impulse balance theory
quantal response
forced contribution
ordinal potential

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cartwright, Edward
Stepanova, Anna
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Kent, School of Economics
(where)
Canterbury
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cartwright, Edward
  • Stepanova, Anna
  • University of Kent, School of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2015

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