Arbeitspapier
Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game
In a laboratory experiment, we investigate if groups consisting of two heterogeneous player types (with different marginal contribution costs) can increase their total contributions and payoffs in a threshold public goods game if transfer payments are possible among the players. We find that transfer payments are indeed used in many groups to shift contributions from high-cost players to low-cost players, thereby not only increasing social welfare, but also equalizing payoffs. In a repeated setting with individual voluntary contributions and transfers, this redistribution effect takes a few rounds to manifest and high-cost players benefit the most in terms of payoffs. The same beneficial effect of transfer payments can also be achieved in a one-shot setting by having the groups vote unanimously on contributions and transfers of all players.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: KIT Working Paper Series in Economics ; No. 73
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Public Goods
- Thema
-
threshold public good
transfer payments
experimental economics
unanimous voting
committee
heterogeneity
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Feige, Christian
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
- (wo)
-
Karlsruhe
- (wann)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.5445/IR/1000050442
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:swb:90-504425
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Feige, Christian
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin
- Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Entstanden
- 2015
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