Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: experimental evidence

Arbeitspapier

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2602

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Public Goods
• Subject: Public goods ; voluntary contributions ; sequential moves ; experiment ; Öffentliches Gut ; Spende ; Spieltheorie ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gächter, Simon ; Nosenzo, Daniele ; Renner, Elke ; Sefton, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26647
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET