Arbeitspapier

Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: experimental evidence

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2602

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Thema
Public goods
voluntary contributions
sequential moves
experiment
Öffentliches Gut
Spende
Spieltheorie
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gächter, Simon
Nosenzo, Daniele
Renner, Elke
Sefton, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gächter, Simon
  • Nosenzo, Daniele
  • Renner, Elke
  • Sefton, Martin
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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