Arbeitspapier

Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting. In one parameterization we find that overall provision is lower under sequential than simultaneous contributions, as predicted, but the distribution of contributions is not as extreme as predicted and first movers do not attain their predicted firstmover advantage. In another parameterization we again find that the distribution of contributions is not as predicted when the first mover is predicted to free ride, but we find strong support for equilibrium predictions when the second mover is predicted to free ride. These results can be explained by second movers' willingness to punish first movers who free ride, and unwillingness to reward first movers who contribute.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2009-17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Thema
public goods
voluntary contributions
sequential moves
experiment
Öffentliches Gut
Spende
Spieltheorie
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gächter, Simon
Nosenzo, Daniele
Renner, Elke
Sefton, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(wo)
Nottingham
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gächter, Simon
  • Nosenzo, Daniele
  • Renner, Elke
  • Sefton, Martin
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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