Voluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theorems

Arbeitspapier

Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2009,030

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Thema: Folk theorem ; Finite horizon ; Prisoners' dilemma ; Experiment ; Gefangenendilemma ; Kooperation ; Extensives Spiel ; Folk-Theorem ; Test

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bruttel, Lisa V. ; Güth, Werner ; Kamecke, Ulrich ; Popova, Vera
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (wo): Jena
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31715
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ