Voluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theorems

Arbeitspapier

Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2009,030

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: Folk theorem ; Finite horizon ; Prisoners' dilemma ; Experiment ; Gefangenendilemma ; Kooperation ; Extensives Spiel ; Folk-Theorem ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bruttel, Lisa V. ; Güth, Werner ; Kamecke, Ulrich ; Popova, Vera
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31715
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET