Reputation and Internet Auctions: eBay and Beyond

Abstract: Each day, a countless number of items is sold through online auction sites such as eBay and Ricardo. Though abuse is being reported more and more, transactions seem to be relatively hassle free. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the sites’ reputation mechanisms prevent opportunistic behavior. To analyze this issue, we first summarize and extend the mechanisms that affect the probability of sale of an item and its price. We then try to replicate the results as found in four recent papers on online auctions. Our analyses reveal that (1) it makes sense to differentiate between ‘power sellers’ and the less regular users, (2) there are variables that have an effect on sales that are often not controlled for, (3) one should carefully consider how reputation is operationalized, (4) neglecting heteroscedastidty in the data can have serious consequences, and (5) there is some support indicating that effects differ across auction sites.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Reputation and Internet Auctions: eBay and Beyond ; volume:26 ; number:1 ; year:2004 ; pages:158-184 ; extent:27 ; Analyse & Kritik ; 26, Heft 1 (2004), 158-184 (gesamt 27)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Snijders, Chris ; Zijdeman, Richard

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.1515/auk-2004-0109
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2404171622569.898743976790
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 14.08.2025, 10:55 MESZ