Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions – An Experiment

Arbeitspapier

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply higher quality in buyer-determined auctions leading to higher market efficiencies in these auctions. Accordingly, buyers prefer the buyer-determined auction over the price-based auction, while only half of the bidders do so. A more detailed analysis of buyers' and bidders' behavior and profits provides insights into their mechanism choice.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86788-296-5
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 254

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: Buyer-determined and price-based procurement ; reputation information ; auction choice ; experimental economics ; Beschaffung ; Auktionstheorie ; Marktmechanismus ; Reputation ; Test

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Brosig, Jeannette ; Heinrich, Timo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
• (wo): Essen
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45906
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ