Communication and Reputation in Procurement Auctions – Some Empirical Evidence
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783867882958
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Ruhr Economic Papers ; 253
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Beschaffung
E-Business
Online-Auktion
Asymmetrische Information
Kommunikation
Reputation
Schätzung
Deutschland
Beschaffung
Electronic Commerce
Internetauktion
Asymmetrische Information
Kommunikation
Schätzung
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Essen
- (wer)
-
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
- (wann)
-
2011
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201107053464
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:36 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Heinrich, Timo
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Entstanden
- 2011
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