Arbeitspapier
Communication and Reputation in Procurement Auctions – Some Empirical Evidence
This paper studies the role of communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Not only positive reputation ratings but also engaging in communication increases a bidder's probability of winning the auction. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86788-295-8
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 253
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
- Thema
-
Communication
procurement auctions
reputation
Beschaffung
E-Business
Online-Auktion
Asymmetrische Information
Kommunikation
Reputation
Schätzung
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich, Timo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
- (wo)
-
Essen
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Heinrich, Timo
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Entstanden
- 2011
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