Arbeitspapier

Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care

How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16165

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Health
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
Thema
long-term care
nursing homes
patient incentives
provider incentives
cost-sharing
episode-based reimbursement
Medicaid

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hackmann, Martin B.
Pohl, Vincent
Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hackmann, Martin B.
  • Pohl, Vincent
  • Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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