Arbeitspapier

Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care

How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16165

Classification
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Health
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
Subject
long-term care
nursing homes
patient incentives
provider incentives
cost-sharing
episode-based reimbursement
Medicaid

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hackmann, Martin B.
Pohl, Vincent
Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2023

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hackmann, Martin B.
  • Pohl, Vincent
  • Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2023

Other Objects (12)