Arbeitspapier
Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care
How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16165
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Health
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
- Subject
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long-term care
nursing homes
patient incentives
provider incentives
cost-sharing
episode-based reimbursement
Medicaid
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hackmann, Martin B.
Pohl, Vincent
Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2023
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hackmann, Martin B.
- Pohl, Vincent
- Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2023