Arbeitspapier
Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care
How do patient and provider incentives affect mode and cost of long-term care? Our analysis of 1 million nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays when capacity binds to admit more profitable out-of-pocket payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients, so moving to episode-based provider reimbursement is more effective in shortening Medicaid stays than increasing resident cost-sharing. Moreover, we do not find evidence for health improvements due to longer stays for marginal Medicaid beneficiaries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7373
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Health
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
- Thema
-
long-term care
nursing homes
patient incentives
provider incentives
cost-sharing
episode-based reimbursement
medicaid
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hackmann, Martin Benjamin
Pohl, R. Vincent
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hackmann, Martin Benjamin
- Pohl, R. Vincent
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018