Arbeitspapier

Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care

How do patient and provider incentives affect mode and cost of long-term care? Our analysis of 1 million nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays when capacity binds to admit more profitable out-of-pocket payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients, so moving to episode-based provider reimbursement is more effective in shortening Medicaid stays than increasing resident cost-sharing. Moreover, we do not find evidence for health improvements due to longer stays for marginal Medicaid beneficiaries.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7373

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Health
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
Thema
long-term care
nursing homes
patient incentives
provider incentives
cost-sharing
episode-based reimbursement
medicaid

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hackmann, Martin Benjamin
Pohl, R. Vincent
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hackmann, Martin Benjamin
  • Pohl, R. Vincent
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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