- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Maße
-
21 cm
- Umfang
-
XIII, 134 S.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
graph. Darst.
Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diss., 2015
- Schlagwort
-
Vertragstheorie
Dauer
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Moral Hazard
Arbeitsvertrag
Arbeitsuche
Arbeitsmobilität
Eigentümerstruktur
Wiederholte Spiele
Theorie
Kontrakttheorie
Verweildauer
LEN-Modell
Moral Hazard
Arbeitsvertrag
Dienstvertrag
Stellensuche
Arbeitsmobilität
Aktionärsstruktur
Unendliches Spiel
- Urheber
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
11.06.2025, 14:01 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
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