On and Off Contract Remedies

Arbeitspapier

A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two fundamental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) 'affirm' the contract and seek money damages or specific performance; or (ii) 'disaffirm' the contract with the remedy of rescission and restitution. This simple dichotomy of contract remedies applies broadly in both common law and civil law practice. We show here that this remedial regime allows parties to write simple contracts that induce first-best cooperative investments.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 290

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Contract Law ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Labor Contracts ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
• Thema: breach remedies ; incomplete contracts ; cooperative investments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Brooks, Richard ; Stremitzer, Alexander
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13264
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93776
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13264-5
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ