Arbeitspapier
Behaviorally efficient remedies: An experiment
Under common law, the standard remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages. Under continental law, the standard is specific performance. The common law solution is ex post efficient. But is it also ex ante efficient? We use experimental methods to test whether knowing that non-fulfilment will only lead to damages deters mutually beneficial trade. The design excludes aversion against others willfully breaking their promises. We find that there is indeed less trade if specific performance is not guaranteed, provided the preference for the traded commodity is sufficiently pronounced.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2017/17
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Externalities
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Contract Law
- Thema
-
remedies
breach of contract
specific performance
expectation damages
reliance damages
donation
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Engel, Christoph
Freund, Lars
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Engel, Christoph
- Freund, Lars
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2017
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