Profit Shifting and FDI Restrictions

Arbeitspapier

Tariffs have almost completely disappeared but various restrictions on foreign entry remain for multinationals. Many trade agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have been signed to lower tariffs and reduce the risks of expropriation. Why do we see so few agreements removing FDI entry barriers? Could the contemporary rise of tax havens where multinationals can shift their profits explain the absence of FDI agreements? In this paper I develop a model in which governments can restrict the entry of foreign affiliates and multinationals can shift their profits across countries. I first demonstrate that the possibility for multinationals to repatriate their profits is a determinant of FDI restrictions. An agreement can solve for the resulting inefficiency. However, I show that an agreement is made unnecessary when (i) there is foreign lobbying that pushes for more entry, or when (ii) firms can shift profits to tax havens. Tax treaties that reduce profit shifting would be a first step towards more agreements that reduce FDI restrictions. I conclude by providing empirical evidence that profit shifting affects the choice of FDI restrictions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5885

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
• Subject: FDI ; multinationals ; investment agreements ; lobby ; profit shifting

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lebrand, Mathilde
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141862
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET