Arbeitspapier

Competition for FDI and Profit Shifting

When countries compete for the location of a new multinational plant they need to be aware of the profit shifting opportunities this new plant creates for the global multinational firm. By modelling explicitly the multinational's intra-firm transactions, we show that the home market advantage that large countries have due to their size will be counteracted by such profit shifting opportunities. As a result of this, large countries will not be able to capitalize on their size and sustain high corporate taxes. We show that, on the basis of these profit shifting opportunities, a small country can easily win the location game ahead of a large country. How lenient the small country is in implementing transfer pricing regulations turns out to be an important variable in such location games.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5153

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Multinational Firms; International Business
Thema
profit shifting
competition for FDI
location game

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ma, Jie
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ma, Jie
  • Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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