Arbeitspapier
Asymmetric Capital Tax Competition with Profit Shifting
This paper analyses capital tax competition between jurisdictions of different size when multinational firms can shift some fraction of their tax base between them. For the case of revenue maximizing governments, we show that introducing profit shifting will not generally increase downward pressure on tax rates. We find that profit shifting decreases the tax-base elasticity of the low tax jurisdiction while increasing the elasticity of the high tax jurisdiction. Therefore, by the direct (impact) effect, tax rates will converge as a result of additional profit shifting opportunities. In general equilibrium, however, tax rates may decrease or increase in both jurisdictions.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2004-23
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
- Subject
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tax competition
asymmetric countries
profit shifting
multinational enterprises
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Stöwhase, Sven
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (where)
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München
- (when)
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2004
- DOI
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doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.454
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-454-3
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:47 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Stöwhase, Sven
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Time of origin
- 2004