Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric Capital Tax Competition with Profit Shifting

This paper analyses capital tax competition between jurisdictions of different size when multinational firms can shift some fraction of their tax base between them. For the case of revenue maximizing governments, we show that introducing profit shifting will not generally increase downward pressure on tax rates. We find that profit shifting decreases the tax-base elasticity of the low tax jurisdiction while increasing the elasticity of the high tax jurisdiction. Therefore, by the direct (impact) effect, tax rates will converge as a result of additional profit shifting opportunities. In general equilibrium, however, tax rates may decrease or increase in both jurisdictions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2004-23

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
Thema
tax competition
asymmetric countries
profit shifting
multinational enterprises

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Stöwhase, Sven
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2004

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.454
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-454-3
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:47 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Stöwhase, Sven
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2004

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