Arbeitspapier

Competition for FDI and Profit Shifting

When countries compete for the location of a new multinational plant they need to be aware of the profit shifting opportunities this new plant creates for the global multinational firm. By modelling explicitly the multinational's intra-firm transactions, we show that the home market advantage that large countries have due to their size will be counteracted by such profit shifting opportunities. As a result of this, large countries will not be able to capitalize on their size and sustain high corporate taxes. We show that, on the basis of these profit shifting opportunities, a small country can easily win the location game ahead of a large country. How lenient the small country is in implementing transfer pricing regulations turns out to be an important variable in such location games.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5153

Classification
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Multinational Firms; International Business
Subject
profit shifting
competition for FDI
location game

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ma, Jie
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ma, Jie
  • Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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